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Abstract
We estimate a flexible dynamic model of education choices and early ca-
reer employment outcomes of the French population. Individuals are allowed
to choose between 4 options: continue to the next grade, accept a perma-
nent contract, accept a temporary contract, or withdraw from the labor force
(a residual state). Our analysis focuses on the comparison between French
Second-Generation Immigrants whose parents are born in Africa and French-
natives. We find that schooling attainments explain around two thirds of the
differences in access to early career employment stability. However, one third
cannot be linked to observed investment in human capital.
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1 Introduction
Continental European labor markets are often pictured as being character-
ized by a relatively low degree of flexibility, when compared to Anglo-Saxon
countries. This is particularly the case for France and Italy (OECD, 1999,
Table 2.2). This inflexibility is particularly acute at the firing level. In prac-
tice, it implies that individuals holding employment must be paid relatively
high severance pay in case employment downsizing is necessary.1 As a con-
sequence, firms may be reluctant to grant permanent contracts to new hires
and favor limited term contracts.2 This theoretical prediction is largely sup-
ported by the data. About 30% of newly hired workers in the French labor
market get a permanent contract for their first job, although the share of
permanent contracts in total employment is 86% (INSEE, Enqueˆte emploi,
2005).
At the same time, the high incidence of criminal activities and social tur-
moil in areas densely populated with immigrants has pushed French policy
makers to question the level of integration of second generation immigrants.
In 1999, the unemployment rate of second generation immigrants aged 19-29
was 30% (nearly 40% if the parents came from Algeria or Morocco), whereas
it was 20% for children with both parents born in France. This inequality
is also noticeable at the level of early career employment contracts. For in-
stance, only 23% of second generation immigrants with both parents born
in an African country get a permanent contract for their first job compared
to 32% for young workers with both parents born in France. While dis-
crimination has been advanced as a possible cause, potential differences in
pre-market skill investment (such as differences in education) may also be im-
portant. From an economist perspective, differences in early career outcomes,
between natives and second generation immigrants, which persist after con-
ditioning on education, are particularly interesting. It is those differences
that are important to quantify.
The poor performance of second generation immigrants has also attracted
attention in European countries, like Denmark (Nielsen et al., 2003) and
the Netherlands (Van Ours and Veenman, 2003). In the United States, the
1A vast literature deals with the impact of employment protection legislation (in par-
ticular firing costs) on unemployment and labor mobility (eg., Bentolila and Bertola, 1990;
Bertola, 1990; Garibaldi, 1998; Mortensen and Pissarides 1999).
2Indeed, there is a considerable amount of debate going on between European countries
about the optimal level of job and social security that the European economy can stand.
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economic performances of second generation immigrants appear to have been
much better. For instance, Chiswick and DebBurman (2004) and Card (2005)
find no gap in schooling attainments and wages between second generation
immigrants and US-natives.
Surprisingly, and despite the recent incidence of violent crimes in French
banlieues, very few economists have investigated the relative performance of
second generation immigrants in France. As of now, Aeberhardt and Pouget
(2007) and Aeberhardt et al. (2007) are the only recent papers studying the
wage gap between second generation immigrants and children of parents born
in France. Both papers are based on econometric models in which schooling
is assumed to be exogenous.
In this paper, we perform an econometric analysis of individual educa-
tional choices and early labor market outcomes. We estimate a reduced-form
dynamic model of education and early career outcomes. We focus on the
nature of the early career employment contracts and more precisely whether
the term of the contract is fixed (limited) or permanent (unlimited). We
model individual trajectories as a collection of sequential dynamic discrete
choices, in the spirit of Cameron and Heckman (1998, 2001). We consider
two sub-populations that are indexed by the country of origin of the par-
ents: “French-natives” (those for whom both parents were born in France
with French citizenship), and “African-natives” (those for whom both par-
ents were born in an African country with a non-French citizenship).
At the outset, it should be pointed out that the model is very flexible.
It assumes that, for each grade level completed, individuals are allowed to
choose within a set that contains 4 options: i) continue to the next grade,
ii) accept a Permanent Contract (PC), iii) accept a Fixed Term Contract
(FTC), or iv) withdraw from the labor force (a residual state). So, given
a completed grade level, each choice (each element in the set) has its own
latent utility equation, which is parameterized as a function of a large set
of parental background variables and unobserved heterogeneity. As in a
standard Roy model, there exists a different set of equations for each possible
grade level. This model allows us to measure separate effects of education
level on the employment outcome probabilities. For instance, the effect of
completed education on the likelihood of a particular early career outcome
(say obtaining a permanent contract) is not captured by a single parameter
but by a collection of several parameters characterizing individual unobserved
abilities, and other parameters measuring the effect of parents’ occupation,
location and geographical origin on a given outcome. As a consequence, the
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model contains a very large number of parameters.3
Our general objective is to explain the schooling and employment out-
comes of second generation immigrants from Africa and French-natives. We
ask the following questions. Do parents’ background and unobserved skills
and motivation explain schooling attainments in the same way for French-
natives and African-natives? Is the schooling gap between French-natives
and second generation immigrants sufficient to explain the early career em-
ployment gap? If not, what is the impact of education relative to other
factors?
We now summarize the main findings. First, the relative impacts of
observed and unobserved factors on the probability of reaching a particular
grade level appear to be similar across groups. Around 60% of the cross-
sectional variance of the probability of completing five years of college is
explained by parents’ background, 15% by early cognitive skills and 25%
by unobserved skills and motivation. For lower schooling attainments, like
completing secondary school and more, the impact of parents’ background is
lower for both sub-samples (around 30%), whereas early cognitive skills have
a stronger impact for African-native attainments (59% vs. 37 for French-
natives), and unobserved skills a smaller impact (15 vs. 34%).
Second, the schooling gap between French and African-natives is not suf-
ficient to explain the early career employment gap. 68% of the cross-sectional
variance in the probability of obtaining a Permanent Contract as a first con-
tract in the labor market is explained by schooling attainments. However,
32% of the differences across groups are associated to returns to observed
or unobserved factors. This is much harder to explain. While this “em-
ployment quality gap” may be associated to differences in skills that prevail
after conditioning on schooling, it may also be attributed to factors such as
discrimination and the like.
Third, the share of the cross-sectional variance in the probability of ob-
taining a Permanent Contract decreases with experience. After two years
in the labor market, it represents 62%, which implies that returns to other
observable and unobservable factors, such as experience, are higher (38%).
3At a more philosophical level, the model may be labeled as semi-structural, since it
is not based on a formal utility maximization procedure. It is also important to note
that because the model is explicitly dynamic (education choices may affect post-schooling
choices even after conditioning on unobserved heterogeneity), it cannot be logically esti-
mated by IV techniques (the most popular method of estimation among empirical labor
economists). For more details, see Keane (2007) and Belzil and Hansen (2008).
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In the following section, we introduce the database used in this article.
The econometric model is described in the next part. Then, we present the
results of estimations and conclude.
2 The Data: Ge´ne´ration 98
Our work is based on Ge´ne´ration 98, a large scale survey conducted in France
by Ce´req.4 It provides detailed information on the socio-demographic back-
ground and employment characteristics of young individuals who left school
in the year 1998 and were interrogated in early 2001. Re-interviews have
been conducted for half of the sample in 2003, but we do not use them here
since we focus on employment conditions during the first two years after
school completion. The aim of Ge´ne´ration 98 is to document many aspects
of early labor market transitions. In particular, Ge´ne´ration 98 provides in-
formation on spells of employment, unemployment, and training experienced
between school completion (labor market entrance) and the date of the sur-
vey. Therefore, information on three years of the generation’s working life is
available and each period of employment is well documented. The personal
labor market history of survey respondents has been reconstructed, month
by month, during the period 1998-2001.
Because Ge´ne´ration 98 is a national survey of those who left the educa-
tional system at a particular point in time (1998), all individuals faced the
same labor market conditions after 1998.
2.1 Parents’ Country of Origin
Our sample is composed of 42,674 individuals. The group of French-natives
contains 40,525 individuals whose both parents were born in France and
had the French citizenship at birth. The second group is composed of 2,149
African-natives, i.e. whose both parents were born in an African country and
did not have the French citizenship at birth. Individuals belonging to this
last group are also called second generation immigrants from Africa.
4French Center for Research on Education, Training and Employment.
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2.2 Education
In order to model education, we use the highest educational level (reached in
1998). The educational level variable falls in 7 categories: 1) no qualification;
2) vocational high school degree; 3) high school degree (baccalaure´at, A
level); 4) some college but leaving higher education without graduating; 5)
technical or vocational college or ordinary college (baccalaure´at and 2 years);
6) those graduated who completed 3 or 4 years of college and 7) those who
completed 5 years of college and more, elite business or engineering school
university degrees.
2.3 Employment Contracts
The data contain information on the nature of the employment contract at
the beginning of each employment spell, as well as changes in the contract
type within the spells. We create two categories of contracts, distinguished
by their term, defined when the contract is signed by the employer and the
employee.
The Permanent Contracts (PC) category regroups the CDI (contracts
with indefinite duration) as well as contracts held by civil servants. The
duration of a CDI is not set ex-ante and the employer has to pay a firing cost
if he wants to lay-off a worker employed under such a contract.
The category named Fixed Term Contracts (FTC) refers to all types of
contracts whose term is defined ex-ante. It regroups the CDD (contracts with
limited duration), which is the most common form of fixed term employment,
but also subsidized contracts, apprenticeship contracts and self-employment.
Contrary to a CDI, no cost is supported by the employer at the end of a
CDD, but CDD have to be used under some restrictions. According to the
French legislation, a CDD cannot be used to fill a job that would exist under
normal and permanent business conditions for a given firm. Moreover, a
CDD can be renewed only once, and the maximum employment duration
under a CDD can not exceed 18 months.
6
3 The Econometric Model
We model schooling decisions as a sequential dynamic discrete choice model.5
At each grade level, individuals are assumed to make a choice between ob-
taining more schooling and labor market work. We model three different
post-schooling outcomes: i) employed in a Permanent Contract (PC), ii) em-
ployed in a Fixed Term Contract (FTC) and iii) out of the labor force (Out),
a residual state.6
Because the model is interpreted as the reduced-form of a more involved
structure, the terms choices and outcomes may be used interchangeably.7
To estimate the model, we use several observable factors: family char-
acteristics (parents’ occupation and location), gender, immigration status
and a cognitive skill indicator: “late at school”. This variable indicates if
the individual enters secondary school after being 11 years old, which is the
“normal” age at which children attain this level without schooling delay. On
top of these observable variables, we have to introduce an individual unob-
served time invariant heterogeneity term, in order to control for educational
selectivity. Indeed, there are unobservable factors, such as “motivation” or
“ability”, that influence schooling decisions at each grade level. Cameron
and Heckman (1998) explain that ignoring these effects creates an omitted
variable bias that understates the true effects of family background variables
on educational attainments, especially at higher grades. Indeed, ability and
family characteristics are negatively correlated at higher grades: individuals
with low family background characteristics continue schooling only if they
have a high ability.
As in Cameron and Heckman (1998, 2001), the model is specified as a
sequence of multinomial logistic probabilities with unobserved heterogeneity.
Let C be the set of choices at the end of each grade level:
C = {s, c1, c2, c3}
c1, c2 and c3 are the 3 employment outcomes (respectively employed in a
permanent job, employed in a fixed term job and out of the labor force),
5Modeling schooling decisions as a reduced-form transition (hazard) model has been
done in Cameron and Heckman (1998, 2001), Belzil (2007).
6We do not distinguish here between unemployed workers who choose not to work, and
unemployed workers who are searching for a job.
7For instance, the data does not allow us to distinguish individuals who accept limited
term contracts because they received no permanent contract offer from those who actually
accept a limited term contract over a permanent one.
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whereas s corresponds to continuing schooling to the next grade level.8 At
the end of grade g, g = 1, . . . , 7, where 1 is the lowest grade, the optimal
choice for an individual i is the following:
ĉi,g = arg max
c∈C
{
U∗i,g,c
}
(1)
where U∗i,g,c is the utility from choosing option c, given completion of grade
g. The expression of this latent variable is given by:
U∗i,g,c = Xiβg,c + νi,g,c (2)
where Xi is a vector of observed variables, βg,c is a vector of parameters
measuring the effects of these variables, and νi,g,c is unobservable by the
econometrician.
The structure adopted for νi,g,c is
νi,g,c = αg,cθi + i,g,c
where θi is the individual specific effect, constant across grades and contrac-
tual outcomes, and which is orthogonal to the i.i.d. error term, denoted
i,g,c. This particular form implies an individual specific intercept term,
γi,g,c = αg,cθi.
Then, assuming that i,g,c is an iid extreme value variable, we can write
the probability that an individual i exits to the outcome c once he achieved
grade g as an extension of McFadden’s (1974) conditional logit model:
Pr (Di,g,c = 1|Xi, θi) =

exp (Xiβg,c + γi,g,c)
1 +
∑c3
a=c1
exp (Xiβg,a + γi,g,a)
for c = c1, . . . , c3
1
1 +
∑c3
a=c1
exp (Xiβg,a + γi,g,a)
for c = s
(3)
where Di,g,c = 1 if individual i’s outcome after grade g is c ∈ C, i.e. if ĉi,g = c.
The probability that individual i exits to the optimal outcome cˆ, after
having completed the optimal grade level gˆ defines the contribution to the
likelihood for an individual i. Precisely, the individual likelihood is
Li(Xi, θi) =
gˆ−1∏
b=1
Pr (Di,b,s = 1|Xi, θi) · Pr (Di,gˆ,cˆ = 1|Xi, θi)
8At the highest grade, s is excluded from the choice set since continuing schooling is
impossible.
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where Di,b,s is an indicator that is equal to 1 when an individual i, who has
already completed grade level b, chooses to continue in school (chooses option
s).
Unobserved Heterogeneity
In the spirit of Heckman and Singer (1984), we adopt a discrete distribution
for unobserved heterogeneity. Assuming that there are K types in the popu-
lation,9 the probability of belonging to type k, pk, is estimated by a logistic
distribution function:
pk =
exp qk∑K
s=1 exp qs
k = 1, . . . , K
where qk’s are parameters to be estimated, with the restriction that qK = 0.
Given we use an individual-grade-outcome-specific intercept term in our
model specification, γi,g,c = αg,cθi, the K types distribution induces the es-
timation of K type-specific intercepts for each outcome equation at each
schooling level. Therefore, unobserved heterogeneity in our model has to be
interpreted as a vector of schooling and labor market unobserved skills, abil-
ity or motivation, whose dimension is K times the number of latent equations
modeled.10
As a consequence, the mixed likelihood, for an individual i, is simply:
Li (Xi) =
K∑
k=1
pk · Lki (Xi) (4)
where Lki (Xi) is the contribution of the likelihood for an individual of type
k.
The model is estimated by maximization of the sum of all individual
(mixed) log likelihoods.
9In what follows, we estimate the model with different values of K, and determine the
optimal number of types using a Bayesian Information Criterion.
10“School continuation” is the outcome of reference at the end of each grade level.
Therefore, there are 3 latent utility equations modeled at the end of each of the 7 grade
levels, corresponding to the 3 employment outcomes.
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4 Estimation
Two versions of the model are estimated. In the first one, the contractual
outcomes correspond to the contract types at the beginning of the first job
after schooling, up to 1 year. As a consequence, the outcome “out of the labor
force” concerns individuals who have no job during the year that follows their
exit from schooling. In the second version, the outcomes are the employment
status exactly two years after the exit from schooling.
For each version of employment outcomes, the model is estimated sep-
arately for French and African-natives. Therefore, each group has its own
unobserved heterogeneity distribution and parameters. A relatively small
number of individuals choose to stop schooling at the end of the fist educa-
tion level (no qualification) in the two sub-samples. Thus, we do not model
employment contract outcomes at this level. As a consequence, the choice
set at the end of the first education level is either continuing or stopping
schooling.
The estimation output of one set of employment outcomes for one sub-
sample consists of a huge set of estimated parameters. A 2 types unobserved
heterogeneity distribution requires the estimation of 271 parameters (290 for
a 3 types distribution and 309 for a 4 types distribution). The calculation
of the effects of interest, such as the impact of attaining a schooling level
on the probability of a particular employment outcome, is not summarized
by a single parameter. Instead, it involves the combination of parameters
associated to unobserved heterogeneity and parameters measuring the effect
of observable characteristics.
5 Results
In this section, we present the results of the different estimations. We first
show results about unobserved heterogeneity and the goodness of fit. Sec-
ondly, we study the determinants of schooling choices and explain the dif-
ferences in schooling attainments between the two sub-samples. Finally, we
show results on employment outcomes. In particular, we look at the roles
of schooling and origin in explaining both first employment outcomes within
the first year, and employment outcomes at two years.
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5.1 Unobserved Heterogeneity and the Goodness of
Fit
5.1.1 Unobserved Heterogeneity
In order to determine the optimal number of types for the unobserved het-
erogeneity distribution, we compare the estimations of the model with 2, 3
and 4 types for each origin group and each set of employment outcomes (first
outcomes within the first year and outcomes at two years).11 The compari-
son of Bayesian Information Criterion values for the different specifications,
shown in Table 1 makes us choosing a 2 types distribution for unobserved
heterogeneity.
[TABLE 1 HERE]
5.1.2 Goodness of Fit
From parameter estimates, we compute the simulated schooling grade at-
tainments and employment outcomes for each individual of each sub-sample.
According to the estimated unobserved heterogeneity distribution, a random
type is assigned to each individual. Then, for each sub-sample, we build the
simulated distributions of schooling attainments and employment outcomes,
that we compare with the actual distributions. Tables 2 and 3 show the
simulated and actual distributions of schooling attainments for French and
African-natives respectively, as well as the average grade levels. Tables 4 and
5 show the employment outcomes distributions. All those tables contain the
type-specific distributions and average grade as well as the average across
types in each sub-sample.
For both groups, the actual and average simulated distributions are very
close to each other. Indeed, our model is capable of explaining both schooling
attainments and employment outcomes almost perfectly.12
Tables 2 and 3 show that African-natives are much less educated than
French-natives: more than one grade of difference on average. More precisely,
28% of French-natives have at most a vocational high school degree (grades
11Since we want to take into account educational selectivity (Cameron and Heckman,
1998), we disregard a model specification without unobserved heterogeneity.
12The evident capacity of the model to fit the data is most likely a by-product of its
flexibility.
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1 and 2) and 46% get a college diploma (grades 5 to 7), whereas, for African-
natives, those proportions are respectively 54% and 19%. As seen in Tables 4
and 5, French-natives are also more often employed in Permanent Contracts
(PC) (24% for the first contract vs. 15% for African-natives, and 43% vs.
26% for the contract at two years) and less often unemployed (15% and 16%
vs. 23% and 26%).
The type-specific patterns in each sub-sample are also very different,
which confirms the importance of controlling for unobserved heterogeneity.
For French-natives, type 2 individuals tend to reach higher schooling attain-
ments: their average grade is around 5, whereas it is only 3.6 for type 1’s,
and their distribution is more oriented towards high education levels. Thus,
one could interpret unobserved heterogeneity as unobserved academic skills,
where type 2 individuals would correspond to high-skilled individuals. Type
2 individuals are also less often employed in Fixed-Term Contracts (53% vs.
65% for the first contract, and 30% vs. 48% for the contract at 2 years).
For African-natives, the correlation between unobserved heterogeneity
and schooling is less clear: the difference between type 1 and 2 average
grades is only 0.3. Concerning the grade distribution, even if the proportion
of unqualified is three times as high for type 2 as it is for type 1 (30% vs.
10%), there are also more type 2 college graduates (5% vs. 0%). The majority
of type 1 individuals are vocational high school graduates (51%, 15% for type
2), and the proportion of general high school graduates is also higher among
type 1 individuals (13% vs. 6%).
Concerning the employment outcomes, it turns out that type 2 individuals
are much less often firstly employed in PC (8% vs. 22%), and more often
unemployed (35% vs. 14%), whereas at 2 years, they are more concerned by
permanent employment (35% vs. 18%).
[TABLE 2 HERE]
[TABLE 3 HERE]
[TABLE 4 HERE]
[TABLE 5 HERE]
5.2 Schooling Choices
In this sub-section, we first study the impact of the covariates on schooling
attainments. Then, we decompose the gaps in the schooling attainments
between French and African-natives into two sources: the first one due to
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behaviors (parameter difference) and the second one due to endowments (co-
variate difference).
5.2.1 Determinants
At each grade level, the decision of continuing schooling to the next grade
is explained by observable covariates (parents’ occupation, location, gender
and “late at school”) as well as unobserved heterogeneity. In order to assess
the relative impact of those different factors, we perform a variance decom-
position on the attainment of three grade levels: high school completion
and above (which corresponds to reaching level 3 or more), higher education
diploma and above (level 5 or more) and college graduation (level 7).
We group the dummies for parents’ occupation, living in an urban area
and gender in a “parents’ background” category.13
For each schooling attainment, we regress the simulated grade attainment
dummies on each group of explanatory factors separately. Then, we compute
the relative share of each group in explaining the grade attainment as the
ratio of the corresponding R2 over the sum of R2’s of each regression.
Table 6 contains the results of this variance decomposition for French
and African-natives separately. The results confirm the importance of un-
observed heterogeneity in explaining the schooling attainments for French-
natives, where its relative share ranges from 24 to 34%. This share is lower
for African-natives (8 to 25%).
Parents’ background is a key determinant of the schooling attainments,
especially at high grades: it explains 59 and 58% of the variance of reach-
ing college graduation for French and African-natives respectively, whereas
it accounts for less than one third of the variance of reaching high school
completion (29 and 26%). This pattern may reflect a certain degree of in-
tergenerational immobility: children born from richer and more qualified
parents are more likely to obtain a higher education diploma. As a conse-
quence, family background plays a minor role in obtaining low grades, and
its importance increases with the grade level.
Early cognitive skills are also a huge determinant of schooling attainments
(17 to 37% for French-natives, 17 to 64% for African-natives). Interestingly,
the pattern across grades is the opposite of parents’ background: the impor-
tance of “late at school” is higher at low grades. One possible explanation
13Removing the gender dummy from this category has a very limited impact on the
results.
13
is that among the set of individuals late at school, are those who are very
weak academically, but there may be also a set of individuals who were late
for exogenous reasons (some bad luck), and were therefore capable of recu-
perating. Thus, among the late at school individuals, it is likely to find a
higher proportion of weak academic individuals at low grades, and a higher
proportion of individuals delayed for exogenous reasons at high grades.
[TABLE 6 HERE]
Then, we merge the simulated samples of French and African-natives and
perform a variance decomposition on this full sample. We introduce origin
as an explanatory factor, which captures differences in parameters as well
as differences in unobserved heterogeneity. Consequently, the relative share
of the variance assigned to the “origin” factor is the variance due to the
parameters and unobserved heterogeneity together.
The results of the variance decomposition for the full sample are shown
in Table 7. The relative shares of parents’ background and late at school,
and their evolution across the grade levels, are close to the ones we saw
in the separate-sample decompositions. The results indicate that, relative
to other factors, the impact of ethnic origin is very small: it explains 3 to
5% of the schooling attainments variances. This result suggests that the
difference in schooling attainments between French and African-natives is
mainly explained by observable characteristics. Our results are consistent
with the huge impact of long run factors in explaining schooling attainments,
as documented by Cameron and Heckman (1998) and Eckstein and Wolpin
(1999).
[TABLE 7 HERE]
5.2.2 Decomposition of Schooling Gaps Between Origin Groups
In this part, we study schooling attainment gaps between French and African-
natives. We perform a decomposition of the difference in the predicted proba-
bilities of reaching grades 3, 5 and 7. For those three grade levels, we compute
the predicted gap, i.e. the gap in the predicted probabilities between the two
groups.14 This gap is decomposed into two parts: the part due to behaviors
(parameters), and the part due to endowments (covariates).15
14The predicted gaps are very close to the gaps actually observed in the population.
15The terminology “behaviors” vs. “endowments” is used here to be consistent with
the distinction made in empirical work. Technically speaking, this terminology may be
14
Let β̂A be the estimated parameter vector of individuals with two African
parents and β̂F , the estimated vector for French-natives. Let XA and XF
denote their respective covariate distributions and Pr(.) be the probability
of interest. The difference in the predicted graduation probabilities can be
decomposed into the two following ways:
EXF [Pr(X
′
F β̂F )]− EXA [Pr(X ′Aβ̂A)]
= gap due to behaviors + gap due to endowments
= EXF [Pr(X
′
F β̂F )− Pr(X ′F β̂A)] + [EXF [Pr(X ′F β̂A)]− EXA [Pr(X ′Aβ̂A)]] (5)
= EXA [Pr(X
′
Aβ̂F )− Pr(X ′Aβ̂A)] + [EXF [Pr(X ′F β̂F )]− EXA [Pr(X ′Aβ̂F )]] (6)
In equation (5) (resp. (6)), the behavior gap is the gap due to parameters
when the distribution of African-natives’ (resp. French-natives’) covariates is
set to the distribution of French-natives (resp. African-natives).16
Table 8 reports the sample analogues of the predicted gaps, and the gaps
due to behaviors, computed from both equations (5) and (6).17 A positive
gap corresponds to a lower probability for African-natives.
For the three schooling grades considered, we can see that African-natives
have significant lower probabilities of grade attainment: 26 percentage points
for high school completion and more, 28 for obtaining a university diploma,
and 9 for college graduation. For the gap in the attainment of high school
and more, the difference due to parameters is not significant, which means
that the whole gap is explained by differences in the observable characteristics
between French and African-natives. Concerning the probability of obtaining
a higher education diploma, the difference due to parameters ranges from 10
to 21 percentage points, which corresponds to 36 to 76% of the predicted
gap. Finally, 32 to 49% of the college graduation gap, is explained by the
parameters.
Those results suggest that, at low schooling levels, only endowments mat-
ter for deciding to continue schooling investment, whereas behaviors turn to
be important for the continuation decision at higher grades. Moreover, we can
seen as abusive. Indeed, unobserved heterogeneity, which is evaluated in our analysis, is
considered here as “behaviors”, whereas it could also be considered as “endowments”.
16The vectors of parameters, β̂F and β̂A, contain the parameters of the unobserved
heterogeneity distributions. As a consequence, “gap due to behaviors” corresponds to the
difference in probabilities due to behavioral parameters and unobserved heterogeneity.
17The gap due to endowments is not reported in the table since it equals the difference
between the predicted and behavior gaps.
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remark that the gap due to parameters is much higher when it is computed
with French-natives covariates (5), rather than African-natives’s (6). Since
French-natives covariates distribution corresponds to a higher socioeconomic
background, this result suggests that differences in behaviors between French
and African natives play a higher role in the upper scale of the socioeconomic
scale.
[TABLE 8 HERE]
6 Employment Outcomes
In this section, we examine the determinants of the employment outcomes for
both origin groups, as well as the differences across groups. In particular, we
study the impact of schooling, which is treated as endogenous in our model.
We show the results that concern both the employment outcomes during the
first year after school completion, as well as the employment outcomes two
years after.
6.1 Impact of Schooling
We compute the type-specific predicted probabilities of being employed in
a Permanent Contract, employed in a Fixed Term Contract, and being un-
employed. Those probabilities are computed at the sample modes, for the
following grade levels: vocational and general high school (grades 2 and 3),
low college (dropouts and 2 years graduates – grades 4 and 5), high college (3
years and more – grades 6 and 7). Then, we compute the differences in the
contractual outcome probabilities between the grade levels and their stan-
dard errors. The differences measure the impact of attaining the next grade
level on the probabilities to be employed in a PC, FTC or being unemployed,
other factors remaining fixed. The impacts on the probability of being em-
ployed in a PC can be interpreted as “returns to schooling” on permanent
employment incidence. This term is used about returns of investment in
education on earnings. As an illustration, estimation results of Aeberhardt
et al. (2007) show positive marginal returns to schooling on wages of both
French-natives and second generation immigrants from Africa. Here, how-
ever, we do not focus on wages, but we study whether or not investing in
education increases the likelihood of being employed in a PC. This issue is of
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particular interest if workers on the labor market attach more value to jobs
offering a stable employment situation.
Table 9 contains results for French-natives and Table 10 results for African-
natives. The next subsection discusses the impact of schooling on employ-
ment in a PC and unemployment.
[TABLE 9 HERE]
[TABLE 10 HERE]
6.1.1 Permanent Contracts
For French-natives of type 2, low college attainment has a negative impact on
the PC employment probability (38 percentage points for the 1st contract,
33 for the contract at 2 years), compared to high school completion. How-
ever, continuing from low to high college has a positive impact (40 and 34
percentage points). Those numerical effects have to be interpreted as upper
bounds for the whole French-natives sample, since the differences for type 1
have most of the time a reverse sign with a much lower magnitude, which
makes them sometimes insignificant.
Concerning African-natives, the high values of the standard errors make
the estimates poorly precise. Only the difference in the likelihood of obtaining
a PC during the first year after schooling between low and high college for
type 2 is significant and high (85 percentage points).
6.1.2 Unemployment/Out of the Labor Force
Increasing the education level has a positive impact on the French-natives
probability of being unemployed during the first year after schooling. Indeed,
attaining low college increases the probability by 3 percentage points for type
1 and 12 percentage points for type 2, whereas the impact of high college is
small (non significant for type 1, 3 percentage points for type 2). Concerning
unemployment 2 years after schooling, the impact of low college is negative
for type 1 and positive for type 2 (10 percentage points in both cases). The
impact of high college has the opposite sign for both types (increase of 10
percentage points for type 1 and decrease of 14 percentage points for type
2).
Again, for African-natives, results are barely significant. We can only
note that there is a huge negative impact of low college on the probability
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of remaining unemployed during the first year after schooling (76 percentage
points).
6.2 Importance of Schooling vs. Permanent Factors
We now determine the importance of schooling, relative to other factors, in
explaining the employment outcomes. We conduct a variance decomposi-
tion of the simulated PC outcome. We regress the simulated PC outcome
dummy on each group of explanatory factors separately and compute the
share of each factor as the ratio between the corresponding R2 and the sum
of R2’s of each regression. “Simulated schooling” is added as a new group
of explanatory factors, on top of the groups already introduced in the vari-
ance decomposition of the schooling attainments: parents’ background, late
at school and unobserved heterogeneity.
Table 11 contains the results of this variance decomposition for French
and African-natives separately. Schooling explains a great part compared to
other explanatory factors. In particular, its impact is twice as high as the
impact of parents’ background, except for the 1st contract within the 1st year
for African-natives. Delay during primary school has a very small impact on
the contractual outcomes (6% and less). This confirms that this variable
has to be interpreted mostly as a measure of cognitive skills (as opposed
to some sort of labor market skill) , since we already noticed in section
5.2.1 that its impact on schooling attainments was as important as parents’
background. Unobserved heterogeneity is a huge determinant: it explains 17
to 20% of the permanent employment probability variance for French-natives
(as high as Parents’ background) and 30 to 40% for African-natives (as high
as schooling).
[TABLE 11 HERE]
Then, we do the same decomposition on the full sample, which contains
the simulated outcomes of French and African-natives together. Parents’
origin is introduced as a new explanatory factor, whereas unobserved hetero-
geneity is removed, since its distribution is origin specific.
Table 12 contains the results of this variance decomposition. It shows that
schooling attainments explain 68% of the cross-sectional variance in employ-
ment under a Permanent Contract for the first job after schooling. Thus,
32% of the variance are not explained by observed investment in human cap-
ital. Differences in observable characteristics or behaviors and discrimination
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may be possible explanations of the gap in permanent employment between
French and African-natives. Moreover, two years after the exit from school,
the schooling impact decreases to 62%. There may be other observable hu-
man capital factors, such as experience, that may have a return on the access
to permanent employment at that time.
[TABLE 12 HERE]
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we estimated a flexible dynamic model of education choices
and early employment contract outcomes. The model was estimated sepa-
rately for Second-Generation Immigrants born of African parents, and the
equivalent sub-population of French-natives.
We found that parental background is the main determinant of schooling
attainments at high grade levels for French and African-natives. Compared
to other factors, it explains about 60% of the variance of completing five years
of college for both French and African-natives. Concerning the attainment of
lower grade levels, however, the impact of parental background is much lower
(around 30% for the probability of attaining at least secondary education
completion) but still the same for both origin groups. At that grade level, the
two sub-samples differ according to the size of the relative impact of “delay
during primary school” (59% for African-natives, 37% for French-natives)
and unobserved heterogeneity (15 and 34% respecively).
Then, we found that origin-specific unobserved heterogeneity and param-
eters seem to explain a small part of the schooling gap between French and
African-natives. Concerning early career employment outcomes, schooling
attainments explain 68% of the employment under a Permanent Contract
in the whole sample for the first employment period in the labor market
after schooling. This result implies that there are still 32% that are not ex-
plained by observed investment in human capital. Two years after the exit
from school, this unexplained part increases to 38%. Thus, unobserved fac-
tors, differences in behavior or discrimination may all be viewed as possible
reasons explaining a significant gap in access to early career job stability.
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Table 1: Bayesian Information Criterion Values for Model Selection
French-natives African-natives
First employment outcome within the first year
4 types 206644.29 12030.97
3 types 206528.13 11948.08
2 types 206326.80 11798.42
Employment outcome at 2 years
4 types 214163.45 12511.16
3 types 213983.91 12380.89
2 types 213837.91 12281.88
Note: The number of estimated parameters of each specification is 309 for the model
with 4 types, 290 for the model with 3 types and 271 for the model with 2 types.
Table 2: Actual and Simulated Grade Distributions: French-Natives
Actual Simulated Sample
Grade Sample Average Type 1 Type 2
1 0.060 0.059 0.088 0.000
2 0.225 0.227 0.315 0.051
3 0.147 0.147 0.142 0.157
4 0.108 0.106 0.109 0.101
5 0.207 0.207 0.152 0.314
6 0.136 0.137 0.122 0.169
7 0.118 0.118 0.073 0.207
Average
Grade 4.057 4.060 3.579 5.013
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Table 3: Actual and Simulated Grade Distributions: African-Natives
Actual Simulated Sample
Grade Sample Average Type 1 Type 2
1 0.210 0.203 0.104 0.304
2 0.332 0.335 0.514 0.153
3 0.097 0.098 0.135 0.060
4 0.174 0.185 0.104 0.267
5 0.102 0.101 0.081 0.122
6 0.058 0.054 0.058 0.049
7 0.026 0.025 0.004 0.046
Average
Grade 2.903 2.906 2.735 3.079
Table 4: Actual and Simulated Employment Outcome Distributions: French-
Natives
Actual Simulated Sample
Grade Sample Average Type 1 Type 2
First employment outcome within the first year
PC 0.239 0.240 0.207 0.302
FTC 0.612 0.610 0.655 0.527
Out 0.149 0.150 0.138 0.171
Employment outcome at 2 years
PC 0.434 0.435 0.382 0.509
FTC 0.405 0.404 0.477 0.300
Out 0.161 0.161 0.141 0.191
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Table 5: Actual and Simulated Employment Outcome Distributions:
African-Natives
Actual Simulated Sample
Grade Sample Average Type 1 Type 2
First employment outcome within the first year
PC 0.154 0.158 0.217 0.081
FTC 0.619 0.610 0.645 0.565
Out 0.227 0.232 0.138 0.354
Employment outcome at 2 years
PC 0.263 0.269 0.178 0.352
FTC 0.476 0.477 0.600 0.365
Out 0.261 0.254 0.222 0.283
Table 6: Variance Decomposition of Schooling Attainments by Origin Groups
French-natives African-natives
Reaching level 3 or more (high school completion)
Parents’ background 29% 26%
Late at school 37% 59%
Unobserved heterogeneity 34% 15%
Reaching level 5 or more (higher education diploma)
Parents’ background 40% 28%
Late at school 33% 64%
Unobserved heterogeneity 28% 8%
Reaching level 7 or more (college graduate)
Parents’ background 59% 58%
Late at school 17% 17%
Unobserved heterogeneity 24% 25%
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Table 7: Variance Decomposition of Schooling Attainments for the Full Sam-
ple
Reaching level 3 or more (high school completion)
Origin 5%
Parents’ background 42%
Late at school 53%
Reaching level 5 or more (higher education diploma)
Origin 5%
Parents’ background 52%
Late at school 43%
Reaching level 7 or more (college graduate)
Origin 3%
Parents’ background 75%
Late at school 22%
Table 8: Schooling Gaps Decompositions
∆ Pr(s ≥ 3) (high school completion)
Predicted gap 0.261 (0.095)
Gap due to behaviors (5) 0.164 (0.088)
Gap due to behaviors (6) 0.083 (0.095)
∆ Pr(s ≥ 5) (higher education diploma)
Predicted gap 0.277 (0.054)
Gap due to behaviors (5) 0.211 (0.056)
Gap due to behaviors (6) 0.100 (0.053)
∆ Pr(s ≥ 7) (college graduate)
Predicted gap 0.093 (0.014)
Gap due to behaviors (5) 0.046 (0.021)
Gap due to behaviors (6) 0.030 (0.014)
Note: In parenthesis: Standard errors computed using the Cholesky factorization
method.
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Table 9: Schooling Returns: French-Natives
Type 1 Type 2
First employment outcome within the first year
Pr(PC|s = 4, 5)− Pr(PC|s = 2, 3) 0.050 (0.013) -0.376 (0.017)
Pr(FTC|s = 4, 5)− Pr(FTC|s = 2, 3) -0.076 (0.017) 0.258 (0.019)
Pr(OUT|s = 4, 5)− Pr(OUT|s = 2, 3) 0.026 (0.011) 0.118 (0.014)
Pr(PC|s = 6, 7)− Pr(PC|s = 4, 5) -0.034 (0.026) 0.398 (0.014)
Pr(FTC|s = 6, 7)− Pr(FTC|s = 4, 5) 0.026 (0.021) -0.428 (0.016)
Pr(OUT|s = 6, 7)− Pr(OUT|s = 4, 5) 0.008 (0.016) 0.030 (0.011)
Employment outcome at 2 years
Pr(PC|s = 4, 5)− Pr(PC|s = 2, 3) 0.166 (0.038) -0.330 (0.013)
Pr(FTC|s = 4, 5)− Pr(FTC|s = 2, 3) -0.069 (0.023) 0.228 (0.013)
Pr(OUT|s = 4, 5)− Pr(OUT|s = 2, 3) -0.097 (0.018) 0.101 (0.009)
Pr(PC|s = 6, 7)− Pr(PC|s = 4, 5) -0.106 (0.013) 0.344 (0.011)
Pr(FTC|s = 6, 7)− Pr(FTC|s = 4, 5) 0.011 (0.012) -0.201 (0.010)
Pr(OUT|s = 6, 7)− Pr(OUT|s = 4, 5) 0.095 (0.006) -0.143 (0.008)
Note 1: Predicted probabilities are computed for a man having a white collar father,
a white collar mother, living in a urban area and not having been delayed at school.
Note 2: In parenthesis: Standard errors computed using the Cholesky factorization
method.
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Table 10: Schooling Returns: African-Natives
Type 1 Type 2
First employment outcome within the first year
Pr(PC|s = 4, 5)− Pr(PC|s = 2, 3) 0.305 (0.358) -0.013 (0.035)
Pr(FTC|s = 4, 5)− Pr(FTC|s = 2, 3) -0.643 (0.785) 0.771 (0.145)
Pr(OUT|s = 4, 5)− Pr(OUT|s = 2, 3) 0.338 (0.612) -0.757 (0.144)
Pr(PC|s = 6, 7)− Pr(PC|s = 4, 5) -0.471 (0.280) 0.851 (0.094)
Pr(FTC|s = 6, 7)− Pr(FTC|s = 4, 5) 0.579 (0.636) -0.763 (0.086)
Pr(OUT|s = 6, 7)− Pr(OUT|s = 4, 5) -0.107 (0.523) -0.088 (0.087)
Employment outcome at 2 years
Pr(PC|s = 4, 5)− Pr(PC|s = 2, 3) -0.240 (0.649) -0.064 (0.317)
Pr(FTC|s = 4, 5)− Pr(FTC|s = 2, 3) 0.336 (0.407) 0.106 (0.168)
Pr(OUT|s = 4, 5)− Pr(OUT|s = 2, 3) -0.096 (0.481) -0.041 (0.232)
Pr(PC|s = 6, 7)− Pr(PC|s = 4, 5) 0.399 (0.370) 0.133 (0.141)
Pr(FTC|s = 6, 7)− Pr(FTC|s = 4, 5) -0.537 (0.356) -0.056 (0.125)
Pr(OUT|s = 6, 7)− Pr(OUT|s = 4, 5) 0.137 (0.194) -0.077 (0.101)
Note 1: Predicted probabilities are computed for a man having a white collar father,
an unemployed mother, living in a urban area and not having been delayed at school.
Note 2: In parenthesis: Standard errors computed using the Cholesky factorization
method.
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Table 11: Variance Decomposition of Obtaining a Permanent Contract by
Origin Groups
French-natives African-natives
First employment outcome within the first year
Parents’ background 22% 38%
Late at school 3% 1%
Unobserved heterogeneity 17% 30%
Simulated schooling 59% 32%
Employment outcome at two years
Parents’ background 19% 19%
Late at school 6% 0%
Unobserved heterogeneity 20% 40%
Simulated schooling 54% 41%
Table 12: Variance Decomposition of Obtaining a Permanent Contract for
the Full Sample
First employment outcome within the first year
Origin 3%
Parents’ background 26%
Late at school 3%
Simulated schooling 68%
Employment outcome at two years
Origin 6%
Parents’ background 24%
Late at school 8%
Simulated schooling 62%
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